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1Chapter 6
2Erasing the Magic Circle
3Gordon Calleja AU1
4In striving to establish a theoretical framework for the academic study of games it is
5crucial that we, as game researchers, consider carefully the core concepts that
6pervade our work. Certain metaphors provide the very foundations upon which
7future research is to be built. If we are to move forward, we have to, as is the case
8with any developing field of study, take certain concepts as given. These are the
9tools of our trade. They allow us to progress without having to constantly try to
10re-invent the proverbial wheel. A great deal of work has recently gone into defining
11our object of study. Efforts at synthesising and refining previous game definitions
12undertaken by Juul (2005) and Salen and Zimmerman (2003) have been of great use
13in this respect. But the conceptual awareness I am advocating here delves deeper
14than definitions. It strikes at the assumptions that these definitions and other basic
15concepts that underlie our thinking about games take as given.
16One of these crucial metaphors is the notion of the “magic circle”. This metaphor,
17inspired by the work of Huizinga (1955b) has become popular within the study of
18games as a marker of a separation between the “real” or “ordinary” world and the
19game. This paper follows theorists like Copier (2007), Lammes (2006), Malaby
20(2007) and Taylor (2006) in questioning the utility of the concept for the analysis and
21understanding of digital games. Aside from the normative assumptions the concept
22has on the experiential dimension of game-play in general, it is particularly prob-
23lematic when it is applied to digital games. The issue becomes particularly problem-
24atic when a metaphor adopted to help us understand a phenomenon actually
25mis-represents it. I will argue that this is the case with the magic circle.
26The paper will first give an overview of the concept and its use within Game
27Studies. Then we will consider it’s application in both formal and experiential
28contexts of separation. Finally the paper will demonstrate problems with applying
29the concept in the situated analysis of digital games through a concrete case study.
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30 6.1 The Magic Circle in Play
31 Initially coined by Huizinga (1955b) in Homo Ludens, the magic circle has been
32 widely adopted by Game Studies theorists (Juul 2005; Salen and Zimmerman 2003)
33 to articulate the spatial, temporal and psychological boundary between games and
34 the real world:
35 All play moves and has its being within a play-ground marked off beforehand either
36 materially or ideally, deliberately or as a matter of course. . .The arena, the card-table, the
37 magic circle, the temple, the stage, the screen, the tennis court, the court of justice, etc., are
38 all in form and function play-grounds, i.e., forbidden spots, isolated hedged round, hal-
39 lowed within which special rules obtain. All are temporary worlds within the ordinary
40 world, dedicated to the performance of an act apart (Huizinga 1955b, p. 12).
41 The apartness described here is a defining element of play, to which Huizinga
42 returns frequently throughout his work. For Huizinga, play is a “stepping out of real
43 life into a temporary sphere of activity with a disposition all of its own” (Huizinga
44 1955b, p. 9). In addition, all forms of play, be they those engaged in by humans or
45 animals, have some form of rules and it is the adherence to and upholding of these
46 rules that structure and sustain the magic circle (p. 12).
47 According to Huizinga, the rule-based nature of the magic circle creates “an
48 absolute and peculiar order” (p. 10) within its boundary. The relationship between
49 order and play is a crucial one for Huizinga as only with a vision of play as the ideal
50 of organized human social structures can he go on to use play as an epiphenomenon
51 upon which other aspects of human society and culture and can be compared and
52 measured. Huizinga’s interest in play can be traced to his 1919 book The Waning of
53 the Middle Ages (Huizinga 1954). In this early work Huizinga argues that despite
54 the unattainable nature of chivalric ideals, chivalry survived long after the socio-
55 cultural contexts that engendered it died because of it’s play-like qualities. Later, in
56 The Shadow of Tomorrow (Huizinga and Huizinga 1936), Huizinga argues that the
57 crisis in which the world found itself in at the time of writing was symptomatic of a
58 culture which had perverted the ideals of play. So it is no surprise that in his final
59 work we find such a definitive statement about the ordered nature of play:
60 Here we come across another, very positive, feature of play: it creates order, is order. Into
61 an imperfect world and into the confusion of life it brings a temporary, a limited perfection.
62 Play demands order absolute and supreme (Huizinga 1955b).
63 The magic circle is thus the boundary between order and chaos, between the
64 idealized ritual of play and the mess of ordinary life. As Anchor (1978) points out,
65 the notion of a distinct boundary between play and the real world becomes the
66 cornerstone of a model of play against which higher forms of culture are measured.
67 Once the play model is established in the first chapter of Homo Ludens, Huizinga
68 goes on a tour of facets of culture such as: language, law, war, ritual and ritual;
69 discussing how each expresses the play concept.
70 Although Huizinga sees play as separate from the real, his principal argument
71 rests on proving that the play element pervades (and even precedes) all aspects of
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72human culture. The apart-ness of play is the apart-ness of ritual, which, Huizinga
73points out, shares all of the characteristics of play:
74Formally speaking, there is no distinction whatever between marking out a space for a
75sacred purpose and marking it out for purposes of sheer play. The turf, the tennis court, the
76chess board and pavement-hopstoch cannot be distinguished from the temple or the magic
77circle (Huizinga 1955b, p. 20).
78Salen and Zimmerman, in Rules of Play, review a series of prior game definitions
79in order to build their own. The definition has, as one of its core elements, the
80quality of artificiality written into it. This is later expanded upon in a chapter
81dedicated to the magic circle, which discusses the boundary that sets games apart
82from the real world:
83Although the magic circle is merely one of the examples in Huizinga’s list of “play
84grounds”, the term is used here as short-hand for the idea of a special place in time and
85space created by a game. The fact that the magic circle is just that-a circle-is an important
86feature of this concept. As a closed circle, the space it circumscribes is enclosed and
87separate from the real world. . . Within the magic circle, special meanings accrue and
88cluster around objects and behaviours. In effect, a new reality is created, defined by the
89rules of the game and inhabited by its players (Salen and Zimmerman 2003, pp. 95–96).
90Salen and Zimmerman emphasize the importance of the bounded nature of
91games by comparing idle toying with an object, what Caillois (1962) has referred
92to as paidia, with the formal rule-based activity, called ludus, of a game such as Tic-
93Tac-Toe. Free-play thus becomes a game when the structured frame of the magic
94circle is imposed upon it. Later, Salen and Zimmerman argue that the magic circle
95surrounding games can either be open or closed, depending on the perspective, or
96“schema”, as they call it, one adopts. According to them, games can be viewed as a
97system made up of rules; as a form of play activity and as a form of culture. In the
98case of the first, games are considered as closed systems completely separate from
99the external world. In the case of the second, they can be both open and closed since
100this depends upon our bracketing the game-play experience from the rest of the
101player’s lived history or not. Finally, games as culture are open systems with a
102permeable boundary.
103There are some conflicts between Huizinga’s conception of play and the magic
104circle and Salen and Zimmerman’s appropriation thereof. Huizinga does not use the
105magic circle merely as one example of a list of play-grounds. As was discussed
106above, the apartness described by the metaphor of the magic circle is a salient
107feature of all the facets of culture he discusses and the magic circle becomes a
108shorthand for the notion of boundedness of play, and consequently other facets of
109cultural life with are ritualized in a similar manner. Huizinga, in fact, talks specifi-
110cally about the magic circle in law: “But whether square or round it is still a magic
111circle, a play-ground where the customary difference of rank are temporarily
112abolished (Huizinga 1955b, p. 77)”; war: “Despite appearances to the contrary,
113therefore, war has not freed itself form the magic circle of play” (p. 210) and
114spirituality: “The human mind can only disengage itself from the magic circle of
115play by turning towards the ultimate” (p. 212). The model, of which the notion of
116bounded separation represented by the magic circle is part, is a template upon
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117 which the other cultural situations are compared to and measured. The concept is
118 not, thus, just one example among many as a number of game theorists (Crawford
119 2009; Dovey and Kennedy 2006; Liebe 2008; Salen and Zimmerman 2003) have
120 erroneously claimed, but a core feature of all the examples given.
121 Salen and Zimmerman sideline the central point of Huizinga’s work when they
122 argue for a non-bounded perspective on the cultural schema of games. Proving that
123 cultural constructions are play-like and thus set aside from ordinary life is exactly
124 Huizinga’s central argument. Since the concept of the magic circle is at the heart
125 of Huizinga’s perspective, one cannot adopt it without taking also on board its
126 user’s principal argument. The confusion is compounded by the fact that Salen and
127 Zimmerman seem to be using Huizinga in a positive manner, while at the same time
128 going against the main thrust of his argument without forwarding a coherent
129 critique thereof.
130 Salen and Zimmerman’s use of the magic circle is here being focused on because
131 numerous game researchers have taken it on as a defacto characteristic of games.
132 Others, sensing the problematic implications of a circle, which is sometimes closed
133 and sometimes open, have tried to forward modifications of the concept. Castronova
134 (2005), for example, replaces the metaphor of the magic circle with that of the
135 membrane, arguing that the latter is a better metaphor since it allows for a one-way
136 traffic between games and the real world. In his view, the game inevitably informs
137 the everyday experience of the player, but players should guard the magic of the
138 game world from becoming tainted with real-life concerns.
139 Although Castronova finds the magic circle problematic and tries to work around
140 it by using the concept of the membrane, the rest of Synthetic Worlds is replete
141 with references to a separability between virtual worlds (or synthetic worlds, in
142 Castronova’s terms) and “the Earth”. Castronova is unable to break out of the dualist
143 conceptualisation of separability he earlier attempts to sidestep. He problematically
144 sets virtual worlds apart from the Earth, which is associated with the destruction
145 of otherwise beautiful fantasies that can be sustained in virtual worlds:
146 When Earth’s culture dominates, the game will be over, the fantasy will be punctured and
147 the illusion will be ended for good. . . Living there will no longer be any different from
148 living here, and a great opportunity to play the game of human life under different,
149 fantastical rules will have been lost (p. 196).
150 There are clear difficulties in the application of the magic circle in close analyses.
151 Contrary to Juul’s (2008) claim, the magic circle is anything but a “straightforward
152 phenomenon” (p. 58), accounting as it does for the complexity of inter-relationships
153 between personal experience, culture and reality. Like Salen and Zimmerman, Juul
154 seems to ignore the fact that the metaphor in Huizinga accounts for an entire
155 worldview, not simply the space “where the game takes place” (Salen and
156 Zimmerman 2003, p. 95). A metaphor laden with meaning, as the magic circle is
157 within Huizinga, comes with an ontological baggage that cannot be discounted or
158 ignored. Once we adopt the use of the term, we are also take on the ontology
159 that places a distinct division between the reality/seriousness/utility and play/
160 non-seriousness/gratuitousness (Ehrmann 1968). The difficulties with the magic
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161circle that are erupting within game studies might, in fact, exist because Huizinga’s
162initial formulation thereof was inherently flawed.
163Ehrmann (1968) criticizes Huizinga for conceiving of “ordinary life” or “reality”
164as a stable entity that can be compared, contrasted and measured against play.
165Huizinga takes for granted the existence of a “reality”, perpetually escorted by the
166hesitant presence of quotation marks, that can, in some non-specified manner, be
167divorced from culture and/or play. But as Ehrmann rightly argues, there is no reality
168outside of the culture that constructs it:
169The problem of play is therefore not linked to the problem of “reality,” itself linked to the
170problem of culture. It is one and the same problem. In seeking a solution it would be
171methodologically unsound to proceed as if play were a variation, a commentary on, an
172interpretation, or a reproduction of reality. To pretend that play is mimesis would suppose
173the problem solved before it had even been formulated (33–34).
174Reality cannot be bracketed by closed or open circles, even if we could argue
175that a concept such as the latter is logically possible. Reality does not contain play;
176like any other socio-culture construction, play is an intractable manifestation of
177reality. A consideration of games, whether be it from the perspective of the game as
178object, game as activity or the game’s role in the wider community, is a consider-
179ation of reality. As Taylor (2006) has rightly argued, such a perspective ignores the
180grounded analysis of these objects and activities while sidelining the fact that they
181are very much part and parcel of the mundane, everyday reality.
182Huizinga himself does not manage to sustain the dichotomy between the
183play-element, and consequently those aspects of culture that correspond to it,
184and the “ordinary life” it is distinguished from. A symptom of this uneasy dichot-
185omy is Huizinga’s exposition of the relationship between play and seriousness.
186As Anchor argues:
187On the one hand, Huizinga repeatedly insisted that play does not exclude seriousness – if
188the two were mutually exclusive, it would obviously make no sense to ask how far culture
189itself bears the character of play. On the other hand, Huizinga was equally insistent on
190maintaining play and seriousness as two separate categories. As a result of this ambiguity,
191he was unable to provide an objective criterion for judging where play ends and seriousness
192begins (Anchor 1978, p. 87).
193According to Ehrmann there is a tension in Huizinga between arguing for play as a
194primary component of culture, and at the same time viewing it as a complement which
195can be subtracted leaving an impoverished, but intact whole. This is evident not only in
196Homo Ludens, but even earlier in his In the Shadow of Tomorrow where he attributes
197the decay of culture to the absence of the play-element therein. Huizinga describes
198play as an “accompaniment” (p. 9) or adornment to a reality external to it. Play is an
199addition to the “necesseties of life” (p. 9). And this allowsHuizinga to retain play as an
200entity untainted by the interests of economics and utility, and is thus described as a
201“disinterested” (Huizinga 1955b, p. 9) or unproductive activity, which “stands outside
202the immediate satisfaction of wants and appetites” (p. 9). But clearly the expenditure
203of energy and time creates something. Now since the play-space is cordoned off from
204the real, whatever is produced through play must be consumed within play itself,
205otherwise it runs the risk of atrophying the play-element (p. 198). This ideal of play is
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206 not sustainable in actuality. As Ehrmann points out, the supposedly interior world of
207 play cannot exist without reference to its exterior, and hence become an integral part of
208 the same economy:
209 The interior occupied by play can only be defined by and with the exterior of the world, and
210 inversely that play viewed as an exterior is only comprehensible by and with the interior of
211 the world; that together they participate in the same economy. Play cannot therefore be
212 isolated as an activity without consequences. Its integrity, its gratuitousness are only
213 apparent, since the very freedom of the expenditure made in it is part of a circuit which
214 reaches beyond the spatial and temporal limits of play (Ehrmann 1968, pp. 42–43).
215 The theoretical problems in Homo Ludens Ehrmann points to stem from
216 Huizinga’s inability to reconcile a notion of play as bracketed from the everyday,
217 utilitarian real; in other words a view of play as an ideal space circumscribed by the
218 magic circle, and the claim that play pervades culture. As theorists like Anchor
219 (1978), Ehrmann (1968), Fink (1968) and later Copier (2007), Lammes (2006),
220 Malaby (2007), Pargmann and Jakobsson (2006) and Taylor (2006) have argued, a
221 dichotomous view on the relationship between play/games and the real world does
222 not survive close analysis, whether this is derived from the critical humanities or the
223 applied social sciences. This is not simply a rejection of dichotomies for their own
224 sake, as Juul (2008) states in his response to critical reactions to the magic circle,
225 but an acknowledgement that a close reading of positions that characterize issues
226 such as culture and experience in dichotomous ways is bound to run into methodo-
227 logical quandaries which result in reductive, mis-representations of the phenome-
228 non under scrutiny. Juul argues that the critique of binary relationships is
229 “a remnant of a battle fought long ago” (p. 64) and that game studies should
230 move on. The battle has been fought long ago in various disciplines and it has
231 been clearly established that such dichotomies are not the best foundations upon
232 which to understand cultural phenomena, which is exactly why theorists like
233 Copier, Malaby, Pargmann, Jakobsson, Taylor’s and others have taken a stance
234 against their uncritical re-introduction into game studies. The rest of the paper will
235 give a situated account of why the concept of the magic circle is (a) redundant, and
236 (b) misleading, when applied to the specific context of digital games.
237 6.2 The Magic Circle and Digital Games
238 Written in a pre-digital age, the treatment of play within Homo Ludens is based
239 entirely upon socially agreed-upon and upheld conventions. Game researchers
240 which consider games as a universal phenomenon ranging across various media
241 such as Bryce and Rutter (2006), Juul (2005), Salen and Zimmerman (2003) rightly
242 argue for an acknowledgement of the continuity between digital and non-digital
243 games. As I have argued elsewhere (Calleja 2007), this taken for granted equiva-
244 lence between physical and digital games is not tenable across all areas of research
245 in games. The magic circle, predicated as it is on its being upheld by its participants
246 (be they players, cultists, lawyers or poets) is strongly influenced by this question of
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247medium. The following sections will argue against the use of the magic circle in the
248case of digital games based on the two dimensions on which it is usually discussed:
249the formal separation in space and time and the psychological separation.
2506.3 A Separation in Space
251In Half-Real Juul (2005) draws on the magic circle to describe the relationship
252between the space where the games take place from the rest of the world. According
253to Juul, physical games and board games take place in a space which “is a subset
254of the space of the world: The space in which the game takes place is a subset of
255the larger world, and a magic circle delineates the bounds of the game” (Juul 2005,
256p. 164). The boundary can be made up of spatial perimeters and is often also
257temporally defined. The game can be limited to a specific area such as a tennis
258court or fencing piste’, or woven into the everyday world such as in Live Action
259Role-Playing Games (LARPs), treasure hunts, and other forms of pervasive
260gaming. Here the spatial perimeter is less defined than the temporal one. The spatial
261and temporal boundaries of the magic circle in physical games are upheld by a
262social agreement clarifying the interpretation and validation of actions, utterances,
263and outcomes; in other words, the rules.
264But in the case of digital games, where is the magic circle? Juul traces the magic
265circle of digital games through the hardware devices that enable their representation:
266[T]he magic circle is quite well defined since a video game only takes place on the screen
267and using the input devices (mouse, keyboard, controllers) rather than in the rest of the
268world; hence there is no “ball” that can be out of bounds (Juul 2005, pp. 164–165).
269He goes on to compare the magic circle in physical games with that in digital
270games based on the spatial qualities of each. With physical games the magic circle
271separates real world space from game space, while in the case of digital games
272the magic circle separates the fictional world of the game from the game space.
273The latter is based on an assumption that “the space of a game is part of the world in
274which it is played, but the space of a fiction is outside the world from which it is
275created” (p. 164). In the case of digital games, the utility of the magic circle’s
276function as a marker where rules apply loses its analytical relevance. In physical
277games the distinction is needed because the game rules are upheld socially. Actions
278that take place within the marked area of the game, when this exists, are interpreted
279differently from actions outside that area. In most digital games the distinction is
280void since the only on-screen space that one can act in is the navigable space of the
281virtual environment. The stadium stands in FIFA 09 (EA Sports 2008) or the space
282outside the combat area in Battlefield 1942 (Digital Illusions CE. 2002) cannot
283be traversed, they are merely a representational backdrop. The role of the magic
284circle as spatial marker is thus redundant when applied to digital games.
285The question of fictionality has been discussed at great length in literary theory
286and its adaptation to digital games would require a more lengthy treatment than is
287the scope of the present paper. Walsh (2007) makes a compelling case against
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288 dualist separations of fiction based on the rhetorical specificity of the language
289 (here used in a broad sense of codified systems of representation in any medium) in
290 which the fiction is communicated:
291 Fictionality, I would suggest, functions within a communicative framework: it resides in a
292 way of using language, and its distinctiveness consists in recognizably distinct rhetorical set
293 invoked by that use. . . If fictionality consists in a distinct way of using language, it is not
294 explained by attaching its distinctiveness to some quarantine mechanism conceived pre-
295 cisely to maintain its conformity with non-fictional usage, at the cost of detaching it, in one
296 way or another, from its actual communicative context (p. 15).
297 As Walsh argues throughout his work, the qualities of fiction cannot be fully
298 described formally because they are intrinsically built into the reality of the language
299 that conveys the fiction. If anything, the most enduring fictional worlds like
300 Tolkien’s Middle Earth are appealing because they draw so heavily on established
301 cultural texts and contexts (Northrup 2004). Juul’s assertion that games are made of
302 “real rules and fictional worlds” (Juul 2005, p. 1) hides the fact that both game rules
303 and the representation of fiction are designed constructs, neither of which carries or
304 denies a claim to reality.
305 6.4 The Experiential Dimension
306 More problematically, the concept of the magic circle has also been applied to the
307 experiential dimension of game-play. Within game studies it is often taken as a
308 given that game-play involves entering a particular experiential mode that was
309 described by Bernard Suits (1978) as the “lusory attitude” (p. 52). The lusory
310 attitude is closely tied to the notion of the magic circle because it is similarly
311 built on the assumption that players voluntarily step into an attitude which is apart
312 from ordinary life; an experiential mode that occurs only during game playing:
313 The attitude of the game player must be an element in game playing because there has to be
314 an explanation of that curious state of affairs wherein one adopts rules which require one to
315 employ worse rather than better means to reach an end (p. 52).
316 The voluntary decision to follow an inefficient course of action in order to play
317 by the rules only applies to the socially negotiated aspect of digital games. But the
318 majority of actions possible are programmed into the game system and cannot be
319 changed. I cannot decide to not adhere to the game rules in World of Warcraft
320 (Blizzard Entertainment 2004) and have my character run at twice the speed.
321 If there is an item, ability, or spell that allows me to do so, it lies within the
322 structure of the game rules and its use is thus in adherence to them.
323 But a more serious problem with Suits’ notion of the lusory attitude is that it is
324 formulated as a defining element of games. This creates a problematically circular
325 argument that essentially claims games are activities that require a lusory attitude
326 and that the lusory attitude is an experience that occurs when playing a game. Ifwe
327 had to follow Suits’ logic, the inability in a number of digital games, particularly
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328single-player ones, to voluntarily adopt inefficient means in playing them means
329that we cannot enter into a lusory attitude, and thus such activities are not games.
330As Malaby (2007) points out, we cannot logically use play to refer to both a
331mode of human experience and a form of activity. In other words, we cannot say
332that when we engage with a game we are entering a particular experiential mode
333(the lusory attitude, for example) determined by the very act of engaging with the
334game. As Taylor argues, these forms of experientially deterministic arguments
335simplify the complexity of game engagement:
336While the notion of a magic circle can be a powerful tool for understanding some aspects of
337gaming, the language can hide (and even mystify) the much messier relationship that exists
338between spheres – especially in the realm of MMOGs. . . It often sounds as if for play to
339have any authenticity, meaning, freedom, or pleasure, it must be cordoned off from real life.
340In this regard, MMOG (and more generally, game) studies has much to learn from past
341scholarship. Thinking of either game or nongame-space as contained misses the flexibility
342of both (Taylor 2006, p. 152).
343The objection to the magic circle as a form of experiential bracketing has been
344particularly strong from researchers conducting qualitative studies with players.
345Ethnographic work by Taylor (2006), Malaby (2007), Copier (2007), and Pargman
346and Jakobsson (2006) indicates that such a separation is not found in the situated
347study of gamers:
348Problems with using the concept of the magic circle as an analytical tool have made
349themselves known now and again. These problems become especially clear when the
350researcher in question has actual empirical material at hand that he or she without much
351success tries to understand by applying the dominant paradigm of the separateness of play
352(Pargman and Jakobsson 2006, p. 18).
353An attempt to create a clean demarcation between the game-experience and the
354experience of the world (supposedly) external to it will be severely challenged to
355explain how the players’ personal and social histories can be excluded from the
356game activity. It is hardly possible for the game-space to block out the complexity
357of social and personal relations. The lived experience of the players invariably
358informs, to different degrees depending on circumstance, the experience of the
359game and vice-versa.
360The experiential separation of play becomes even more problematic when
361contemporary developments in digital games, like Massively Multiplayer Online
362Games (hereafter referred to as MMOGs), are considered. Activities like planning
363and coordinating 40 man raids inWorld of Warcraft (Blizzard Entertainment 2004),
364which include several hours of tedious “farming”i of items that will be needed to
365ensure the success of the raid, are often viewed as boring chores rather than
366pleasurable play. Yee has collected a wealth of quantitative data on MMOG players
367and in a recent paper published in Games and Culture he observes how MMOG
368“playing” can often feel like a second job:
369The average MMORPGii player spends 22 hours a week playing the game. And these are
370not only teenagers playing. The average MMORPG gamer is in fact 26 years old. About
371half of these players have a full time job. Every day, many of them go to work and perform
372an assortment of clerical tasks, logistical planning and management in their offices, then
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373 they come home and do those very same things in MMORPGs. Many players in fact
374 characterize their game-play as a second job: “It became a chore to play. I became defacto
375 leader of a guild and it was too much. I wanted to get away from real life and politics and
376 social etiquette followed me in (Yee 2006, p. 69).
377 Further examples of the inadequacy of the magic circle to account for the
378 experience of digital game-play come in a host of other forms: companies
379 employing people to farm in-world gold and sell it on e-Bay or offer character
380 levelling services, social and cultural issues that crop up whenever you have masses
381 of people interact in persistent environments, virtual worlds which require real
382 money expenditure for the acquisition of virtual goods, such as Second Life (Linden
383 Lab 2003) or Project Entropia (MindArk 2003) and more. Dibbell (2006) has
384 written a compelling account of his forays in the trade of virtual assets and gold.
385 In order to investigate the phenomenon often referred to as “real money trade” or
386 the exchange of virtual world items for widely accepted currency, Dibbell embarked
387 upon a year long stint buying and selling property, goods and gold in the
388 popular Ultima Online (Origin Systems 1997) MMOG. Dibbell’s Play Money is a
389 self-reflexive meditation on the wide spectrum of experiences that MMOGs enable
390 and the profound impact these experiences can have on a person’s life. Dibbell
391 describes how his engagement with Ultima Online transformed from a form of
392 entertainment to a full time job. He uses his experiences to foreground the inade-
393 quacy of the magic circle and the application of the work/play binary to MMOGs.
394 But aside from such obvious examples, it is generally difficult to bracket off an
395 aspect of experience that expresses a specific mind-set entered into during game-play.
396 This is particularly evident in digital games since the upholding of the game-rules is,
397 for the most part, upheld by the machine code. It would be incredibly mis-leading to
398 label all forms of interactions in virtual environments with ludic properties as having
399 a specific experiential disposition by the very virtue of engagement therein. We are
400 better served by furthering our understanding of game engagement un-burdened by
401 such normative assumptions.
402 Before concluding the paper I will briefly discuss why the magic circle did not
403 figure in my research with player involvement and immersion in digital games.
404 Its inclusion would have mis-represented the phenomenon under scrutiny, creating
405 a boundary where none existed.
406 6.5 Contexts
407 My doctoral dissertation analyzes factors that influence player involvement in
408 digital games. An important part of the argument is a model that describes the
409 different forms of involvement that games can potentially engage players with.
410 The model plots the different forms of involvement along a temporal scale ranging
411 from general motivation to play games to the situated instance of game-play. If I
412 had taken the notion of the magic circle on board when building my model, I would
413 have needed to signal a point where players “entered” the magic circle; a point in
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414time where activities undertaken are tinged with a playful attitude (Suits 1978;
415Salen and Zimmerman 2003). Although research participants discussed various
416attitudes towards the game along with a host of aspects that clearly engaged them,
417there was no mention of such a shift into a specific attitude that coloured all others.
418If anything, a number of players expressed how games became subsumed as part
419of their everyday lives and, vice-versa, how everyday life became infused with
420discussions and thoughts surrounding games. By placing into question the validity
421of a clear line of demarcation between game and non-game we open up the analysis
422of game involvement beyond the formal parameters of the game. This requires a
423perspective on involvement that extends along a continuum of attentional intensity
424ranging from a general motivation to participate in digital games to a focused deep
425involvement and finally the incorporation1 of the represented space into a habitable
426and immediately accessible domain for exerting agency.
427A dichotomous boundary view of player involvement tells us very little about
428the nature of the experience, and more importantly it hides the fact that game
429experiences vary hugely among different games, different players of those games
430and each specific sitting. By leaving behind an either/or perspective and focusing on
431the specificities of the individual engagement, we open up our inquiry to a richer
432understanding of the feedback loop between player and game that is not norma-
433tively pre-determined by simplistic binaries.
434This thinking extends to notions of immersion and presence. The depth of
435engagement the terms describe tends to similarly be expressed in terms of either/
436or relationships: present or not. These assumptions are pronounced in the metaphor
437of the submergence of the participant into the virtual environment, a subjective
438cogito poured into a containing vessel:
439The experience of being transported to an elaborately simulated place is pleasurable in itself,
440regardless of the fantasy content. Immersion is a metaphorical term derived from the physical
441experience of being submerged in water. We seek the same feeling from a psychologically
442immersive experience that we do from a plunge in the ocean or swimming pool: the sensation
443of being surrounded by a completely other reality, as different as water is from air that takes
444over all our attention our whole perceptual apparatus (Murray 1998, p. 98).
445Presence has similar connotations, but its application is focused more by what I
446will argue is one of the two simultaneously occurring, defining aspects of the
447phenomenon: the anchoring of participants to a specific location within the virtual
448environment that objects and entities within it react to. Up to this point the
449metaphor works. But it also typically refers to the placing of the participant’s
450subjectivity inside the environment in the same way as immersion does. Both
451metaphors imply a uni-directional process that disguises the most potent elements
452of the phenomenon in the context of virtual environments. As has been discussed
453in depth elsewhere (Calleja 2007 AU2), the potency of experience lies in the increasing
454ease and immediacy with which we can extend multiple dimensions of our lived
1 For a more detailed discussion of the phenomenon of incorporation see In-Game: From Immer-
sion to Incorporation available from MIT Press as of Spring 2011.
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455 experience to contemporary virtual environments, particularly in the case of
456 digital games. As the complexity and sophistication of these digital media
457 increase, the metaphor of everyday life becomes more easily adaptable to experi-
458 ences within them. By everyday life I am here referring to the composite nature
459 of contemporary being in its social and media-saturated cultural dimensions.
460 The appeal of otherness that these environments promise becomes organized by
461 the same structuring principles of the everyday social world. Herein lies the power
462 of the composite phenomenon that presence and immersion allude to: a process of
463 internalization and experiential structuring that is compelling precisely because it
464 draws on our fundamental social learning. Lakoff and Johnson (2003) emphasize
465 this dynamic of transference between experiential gestalts as the core of their
466 experientialist ontology:
467 The nature of our bodies and our physical and cultural environment imposes a structure on
468 our experience, in terms of natural dimensions of the sort we have discussed. Recurrent
469 experience leads to the formation of categories, which are experiential gestalts with those
470 natural dimensions. Such gestalts define coherence in our experience. We understand our
471 experience directly when we see it as being structured coherently in terms of gestalts that
472 have emerged directly from interaction with and in our environment. We understand
473 experience metaphorically when we use a gestalt from one domain of experience to
474 structure experience in another domain (Lakoff and Johnson 2003, p. 226).
475 Because of the accumulated definitional and disciplinary issues associated with
476 the use of “presence” and “immersion” I have elsewhere argued that a new term
477 is necessary to permit effective inquiry into the distinctive qualities of virtual
478 environments that moves beyond the dichotomous perspective implied by the
479 current literature on “presence” and “immersion”. I have used the metaphor of
480 “incorporation” to signify an internalization of the digital environment that makes it
481 present to the participant’s consciousness as a domain for exerting agency while
482 simultaneously being present to others within it through the figure of the avatar.
483 The logic behind the displacement of the immersion and presence terms was
484 necessary precisely because the binary they imply becomes detrimental, as a
485 conceptual foundation, to a theory that seeks to explain an intensely subjective
486 and sub-conscious form of experience.
487 6.6 Conclusion
488 As game studies researchers we have the opportunity to adopt existing theoretical
489 frameworks, models and concepts from other disciplines, or to shape our own.
490 Existing academic work in related fields can yield rich perspectives on our research
491 interests, but we need to be particularly cautious when selecting the foundational
492 concepts and metaphors that pervade our work. Starting an analysis of games, or
493 any other cultural artefact or activity, as surrounded by a boundary, no-matter how
494 fuzzy or permeable, presents the immediate challenge of articulating what lies
495 outside of that boundary. Whether it’s the “real”, “ordinary” or “everyday”, notions
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496of boundaries require our object of inquiry to be contrasted and measured against a
497stable reality external to it. But as scholars in a variety of fields that have contended
498with this problem have argued, the thing we are analysing is a manifestation of the
499reality we seek to cordon it off from. Of course, Huizinga and Caillois were writing
500at a time when such ontological partitioning had not yet been challenged by the
501critical lens of post-structuralism. Writing in the twenty-first century, we do have
502the luxury of such an argument and cannot just bury our heads in the proverbial
503sand and take on such terms uncritically.
504Why work with a metaphor that is laden with such problematic implications
505when there are far better perspectives in various fields that represent the phenome-
506non in question? Pargmann and Jakobsson (2006) as well as Crawford (2009), for
507example, have advocated the use of Goffman’s (1986) frame analysis to understand
508the interpretation of social conventions that game-rules ultimately are. This takes a
509body of research that is specifically aimed at explaining the complexity of inter-
510preting social situations and the related structures (such as rules) involved.
511Of course, there are other frameworks we can draw from, but let us settle on concepts
512that are analytically productive not problematically reductive. It seems as though
513we have adopted an overly simplistic concept from Huizinga merely because he
514represents an early engagement with the study of play (and partially games). There
515are a number of interesting observations Huizinga has made about the role of play in
516culture, but the concept of the magic circle, and his overall perspective on culture
517simply do not live up to contemporary scrutiny.
518On a related note, as Crawford (2009) and Liebe (2008) have argued, the media
519specificities of digital games require an altogether different consideration of social
520and experiential dimensions than physical and board games do. On top of this, the
521particular media configuration found in digital games makes the magic circle
522particularly unproductive, if not outright mis-leading. It is high time that we abandon
523the concept of the magic circle altogether, (along with modifications thereof),
524in favour of more nuanced and analytically productive concepts specifically adopted
525for the particular focus we are taking on the complex and varied phenomenon that is
526digital game-play.
527Endnote
528i. Farming refers to the activity of mechanical harvesting resources or repeatedly killing mobs
529that are known to drop items, materials or gold as a goal in itself.
530ii. MMORPG stands for Massively Multiplayer Online Role Playing Game. This term is some-
531times used interchangeably with MMOG or Massively Multiplayer Online Game. The former
532is a subset of the latter which includes other MMO genres such as MMOFPS or Massively
533Multiplayer Online First Person Shooter and MMORTS, Massively Multiplayer Online Real
534Time Strategy. I will be using the term MMOG to refer to all these genres of online games.
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